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1 Introduction 
 
Public intervention in markets today is mainly derived from the global rule that activity 
should only be considered where the invisible hand and market based solutions are inherently 
deficient.1 Regulation in such a cases is argued to be justified because the uncontrolled market 
place will, for some reason, fail to produce behaviour or results in accordance with the public 
interest.2 In all other cases the competitive marketplace potentially leads to welfare 
maximization. 
 
The market based supply of telecommunications, however, has in most countries developed 
only recently after the privatization of the former state-owned incumbent operators. For the 
last twenty years, mobile telephony has been, along with the Internet, the technology that has 
most dramatically changed the telecommunications sector. As the service became more 
common, mobile telephony challenged the notion of natural monopoly within the sector, and 
this has unravelled a wave of regulatory change that has deeply changed the market structure 
of the whole telecommunications industry.3 In the transition period to competitive markets 
entirely ruled by general competition law, the European electronic communications industry 
is still subject to particularly strong measures of public intervention in order to address clearly 
identified market failures in the light of some over-riding public policy concern. One caveat is 
needed at this point: with such enormous complexity resulting from ’regulatory fine tuning’ 
introduced by the NRF, are we going to lose the fresh and radical impetus of deregulation and 
competition?4    
 
This paper discusses the degree of intervention in wholesale access and call origination 
market on public mobile networks under the auspices of the first market analyses carried out 
according to the NRF. The overall deregulatory potential of the NRF envisages increasing 
reliance on ex-post competition law remedies instead of ex-ante regulatory intervention. The 
implicit vision is to address market failures by general competition law where markets are 
effectively competitive, and accordingly reduce the application of sector-specific regulation. 
This phenomenon corresponds with the theoretical approach according to which ex-ante 
regulation should only be applied to “monopolistic bottlenecks” and phased out elsewhere. 
                                                 
1 See Bolter et a. (1990), and Baldwin, Cave (1999); pp. 9. 
2 See Francis (1993); chp. 1. 
3 Valletti (2003); pp. 4. 
4 Grewlich (1999); pp. 943. 
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Despite of this straightforwardness, there will be many more uncertainties ahead as to how the 
value chain for mobile communications services will take shape, where will be its bottlenecks 
and how, when and where regulatory intervention in MVNO arrangements will appear.   
The fact that the MNOs have vertically integrated network and retail operations and are 
protected by high barriers to entry at the network level does not in itself mean that the mobile 
sector cannot become effectively competitive. In previous reviews of the mobile sector, Oftel 
concluded that the structure of four mobile operators operating in a market where there are 
high barriers to entry might result in a range of outcomes, from vigorous competition to 
collusion between the operators. In fact, competition and collaboration are the twin forces 
propelling the mobile sector forward; the question is how regulators capture this antagonism.  
It is the aim of this paper to examine the regulatory margin of manoeuvre which could equally 
lead to the exercise of regulatory forbearance or trigger more ex-ante intervention. Whether or 
not a certain market is effectively competitive will determine whether or not the market needs 
to be regulated by means of sector-specific regulation: to regulate or not to regulate, that 
seems to be the question in markets characterised by strong tendency towards competition.5    
 
2 Application of sector-specific regulation and general competition law: 
a new balance 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
As regards the dual regime of networked industries such as the electronic communications 
two sets of tools are present to influence competitive conditions. sophisticated body of sector 
specific regulation on the one hand, and competition law as applied in the electronic 
communications sector. The former addresses issues before they arise and envisages them in a 
rather general perspective. By contrast, general competition law consists of ex post 
intervention, where an authority reacts against behaviour which has already been adopted by 
one or several undertakings. It is therefore that competition law is considered to be a less 
interventionist tool than regulation.  
 
                                                 
5 Koenig, Bartosch, Braun (2002); pp. 320. 
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Public intervention through sector-specific regulation is closely linked to the concept of 
networked industries. Today, after liberalization and introduction of competition in the 
electronic communications markets, the specific challenges for public intervention stem from 
the fact that most incumbents are still able to enjoy significant advantages by controlling 
essential facilities and exploiting economies of scale and scope. These factors affect 
newcomers to the market, they provide efficiency advantages for large volume and number of 
services and a new entrants will find it difficult to compete with already well established 
network operators.  
 
One important economic reason for regulation is to help achieving the optimum level of 
production from a social point of view. The need for regulation depends on the ability of the 
market to create this optimal situation by itself.6 Historically, the telecom sector has been 
organised by a monopoly network operator, this institutional set up gave enough justification 
for regalution. In the transition period towards competition market imperfections call for 
further regulation. Mobile communications, however, is exposed to competition concerns in a 
much weaker form, because of large number of operators being present from an early stage of 
market development. In fact this industry became the fist major laboratory of competitive 
supply of telecommunications services.7 This fact triggers discussions on whether sector-
specific intervention is still necessary or whether market forces alone would be able to create 
optimal allocation of services for all consumers both in terms of quantity and quality.    
 
2.2 Goals and instruments of regulation  
 
On a very aggregate level the goal of economic regulation in the telecom sector is to promote 
competition and to ensure adequate production of services at appropriate prices. Nevertheless, 
NRAs have to take an utmost account of the complexity of the policy objectives and sub-
objectives. This is due, apparently, to a desire on the part of the European legislator to 
formulate in a didactic manner the values to which NRAs must pay particular attention.8 In 
fact, the NRF aims to identify and create values which value creation introduces constraints 
                                                 
6   Falch (1997); pp. 107. 
7   Gruber (2001); pp. 61. 
8   Nihoul, Rodford (2004); ch. 2. 
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on the type of actions that NRAs may undertake. However, one also has to bear in mind that 
the more constraints an organization face, the less likely that a value will be produced.9
 
Regulators would need very clear objectives, as well as a set of general regulatory principles 
if they were to succeed in stimulating competition in the communications market. At this 
stage, it is worthwhile to recall that the old framework was mainly designed to manage the 
transition to competition, on the other hand, the NRF aims to reinforce competition in all 
market segments.10 Therefore a lighter regulatory approach has been envisaged, whilst 
ensuring that dominant players do not abuse their market power.  
 
In comparison with the old framework, the enumeration of regulatory objectives to be attained 
by NRAs may appear as an innovation in the NRF. Article 8 of the Framework Directive sets 
out three key policy objectives (1) to promote competition in the provision of electronic 
communications networks (2) to contribute to the development of the internal market and (3) 
to promote the interests of the citizens of the European Union. Furthermore, each objective is 
supported by a number of sub-objectives (a whole list can be found in Article 8 paragraph (2) 
(3) and (4) of the Framework Directive). The Access Directive gives the same margin of 
manoeuvre for NRAs, as it lays down a procedural framework for NRAs to follow, and 
identifies factors to be taken into account when granting access, but does not specify precise 
access obligations.11  
 
Yet it is only the so-called public interest theory which takes the sanguine view that 
regulatory objectives are indeed the main justifications for intervention which is to achieve 
overall welfare.12 The world has moved on and learnt much more about the theory and 
practice of regulation. In particular, we have come to recognise the potentials of 
overregulation, high regulatory costs, heavy-handed supervision of firms with an unsuitable 
regulatory instruments and regulatory capture.13 There might be an inherent paradox to over-
regulation: whilst moving towards light-handed regulation, regulatory objectives multiply, 
therefore the firm that may originally have been subjected to regulation because it was seen as 
                                                 
9 Conference presentation held by Zahler, Robert on Evolving sourcing through value-chain analysis, 
Contemporary Issues in Global IT Law, Keble College, Oxford, UK, 8 July, 2004 
10   Farr, Oakley (2002); ch. 1.  
11   See Article 12 (2) of the Access Directive 
12  Consistent with standard economic analysis, public policy increasingly intervenes in markets only to address 
clearly identified market failures or in the light of some over-riding public policy concern.  
 
13   Knieps (2001); pp. 14. 
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natural monopoly now is regulated for a variety of public purposes. This regulatory 
complexity may result in the first instance difficulties for NRAs as they seek to meet varied 
and perhaps contradictory regulatory objectives.14  
  
After goals are specified, the regulatory instruments (resources) available to help achieve 
these goals must be assessed. Some commentators argue that Article 8 of the Framework 
Directives also provides a set of so-called basic regulatory principles, given their general 
character, these principles apply in all circumstances. They are meant to permeate the NRF.15 
These basic regulatory principles flesh out the means to be used in order to reach objectives. 
Among them are the obligations for NRAs to avoid discrimination,16 comply with the 
principle of proportionality17 and remain neutral in technological choices.18 Proportionality 
will be discussed later in this paper as a potential tool for exercising regulatory forbearance.   
 
The most common policy instruments of intervention include (a) entry and access regulation, 
(b) price regulation, (c) control of earnings and (d) the setting of quality standards.19 Very 
often these instruments are applied simultaneously. Here they will be briefly sketched for an 
overview. 
 
Entry restrictions are most visible where licenses are issued e.g. for the operation of public 
mobile networks. Indeed, market structure is determined exogenously by the policy maker, 
but is also influenced by technological constraints.20 Up-front licence fees have had 
significant implications for competition in the market after spectrum allocation: high licence 
fees may be a signal for post-entry collusion.21 Within the framework of sector-specific 
regulation of access, NRAs can act ex ante and impose, as necessary, access and 
interconnection obligations going into substantial details regarding price and technical 
elements of access. For the purpose of this paper it should be noted here that mandating 
access to the network of a mobile operator for Mobile Virtual Network Operators has been a 
hotly debated issue in the mobile era. New thoughts have come that service competition on 
                                                 
14  Francis (1993); pp. 30.  
15  See supra, note 9, pp. 96. 
16 Expressed in various EC provisions, e.g. Framework Directive, Article 8 (3) (c) ensuring that there is no 
discrimination in the treatment of undertakings in similar circumstances. 
17  See Framework Directive, Article 8 (1) ‘Such measures shall be proportionate to those objectives.’ 
18  Ibid. 
19  Sappington, Weisman (1996); pp. 103. et seq 
20  See supra, note 8.  
21  Ibid. pp. 51. 
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accessible infrastructure to a reasonably priced access might lead to the variety and a better 
European consumer’s satisfaction.  Mandated access in most cases goes along with specific 
prices which are to be charged for access. Therefore price controls are among the most 
common regulatory instruments and can take many forms. The dominant paradigm in current 
regulatory reforms is that of forward-looking long-run incremental cost. The idea behind the 
use of LRIC is to set access prices on the basis of an efficient cost benchmark rathen than on 
the operator’s actual (embedded) costs.22 Control of earnings is another important measure, 
usually put into place to prevent companies not restrained by full competition to generate 
unreasonable profits.23  Rate-of-return regulation, widely practiced in the United States during 
the 80’s is a good example. The regulator would calculate an allowable rate of return on assets 
high enough to cover costs and sufficient to maintain investor’s willingness to replace and 
expand the companies’ assets. Lastly, regulating standards in the telecom industry, in which 
significant network externalities prevail, is aimed at preventing welfare losses that might 
occur due to incompatible systems. 
 
2.3 Goals and instruments of competition law  
 
General competition law like regulation is a mechanism for public control of market 
behaviour, but traditionally very different in nature. Yet the perceived antagonism between 
competition and regulation is destined to disappear.24 In fact, competition has already been 
shaping regulation: it is the latter which has been adapting itself to suit the approach of the 
former under the auspieces of the NRF.25    
 
As has been described above social and economic objectives of regulation requires a more 
rigid intervention. On the contrary, the objective of competition policy can be achieved by 
more flexible mechanisms. In the European Union, broadly speaking, there are two goals of 
general competition law: the first is to promote effective and undistorted competition by 
fostering economic efficiency, so as to maximize consumer welfare, the second is to promote 
the integration of the EU member states (the pursuit of the internal market). Over the years 
                                                 
22 Laffont and Tirole (2000); pp. 148. 
23 Baldwin, Cave (1999); pp. 224. 
24 Monti (16 September, 2002) conference speech; ’It is our strong belief that the application of fundamental 
competition law notions, such as market definition and dominance, in an ex ante environment represents the best 
means to ensure a smooth tranition towards a fully liberalised electronic communications market, in which, 
hopefully one day, only the competition rules will apply.’ 
25 Krüger, Mauro (2003); pp. 36. 
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EC competition law has clearly outgrown its internal market origin and now forms a body of 
law that is still linked to its origins yet largely independent in its application, implementation 
and aims.26     
 
Three main types of antitrust rules can be identified. The first type of rules prevents anti-
competitive agreements between operators, such as agreements aimed at fixing purchase or 
selling prices. However, some agreements might be beneficial, though found to restrict 
competition at the wholesale level with potential harmful effects in downstream retail 
markets. A good example can be found in two Commission exemption decisions which set out 
how far mobile operators can cooperate through site sharing and national roaming.27 The two 
decisions provide clear guidance on what forms of network cooperation by mobile operators 
are compatible with the EC competition rules and therefore, declared not to restrict 
competition, or exempted, due to developing powerful network capability that will allow new 
and innovative content and applications to be launched.   
 
The second type of rules deals with firms which enjoy dominant position. The policy 
objective here is to prevent those firms from abusing their dominance vis-à-vis end-users or 
other operators. Examples of prohibited behaviours might include, for instance, refusing to 
deal, imposing excessive or predatory prices, price discrimination, and bundling/tying. 
 
The third type of rules prohibits mergers which would substantially lessen competition. Given 
the difficulty of unscrambling merged companies once they have operated together, most 
legal systems provide for ex ante controls of proposed agreements.    
 
2.4 Two sets of legal tools: parallel application  
 
For the time being, the dualism of general competition rules and sector-specific regulation lies 
in the heart of the applicable access regime. On the one hand it could be detected in the 
integration of competition law methodologies and principles28 in the economic regulation of 
the electronic communications sector (e.g. market definition, assessment of SMP), and on the 
                                                 
26 Cruz (2002); pp. 100 
27 Commission Decision of 30 April 2003 in case number COMP/38.370-O2 UK Limited/T-Mobile UK Limited, 
Commission Decision of 16 July 2003 in case number COMP/38.369 T-Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany 
28 De Streel, Alexandre (2003); pp. 489 
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other hand the parallel application of general competition rules alongside regulation. 
Practitioners are thus presented with two series of tools: distinction between these tools are 
based on the circumstances in which intervention associated with each set of rules takes place.  
When dealing with access-related issues, practitioners should, first examine whether the rules 
of the NRF may be applied. General competition law may be used as a second resource. It 
provides useful tools in three sets of circumstances.     
 
(1) The advantage of general competition rules is that they apply sector independent which 
makes them more flexible than sector-specific rules, especially in cases such as refusal to 
access. Rapid technological developments could bring about new regulatory challenges and 
sector-specific framework would become rigidly opposed to any change. The competition 
rules of the Treaty, therefore, have a gap-filling function as they address issues which cannot 
be dealt with under sector-specific regulation.29  
 
(2) Furthermore, the implicit vision of the new framework itself, meaning that economic 
regulation applies when and until it can control market power more efficiently than antitrust, 
calls for parallel application. As sector-specific regulation may be gradually phased out, some 
markets of the electronic communications sector may solely be governed by the Treaty’s 
competition regime.  
 
(3) Thirdly, general competition law may also be useful in interpreting the NRF where rules 
belonging to the specialised domain of sector-specific regulation allow a wide margin of 
interpretation. This is particularly true since the European legislator has aligned the basic 
concepts and methods of the framework with general competition law. 
 
3 Basics of regulatory intervention   
3.1 Theories of regulation 
 
To begin with, regulation is about constraint, the setting of reasonable limits, the charting of 
middle course somewhere between a totally unfettered activity and prohibition. As Francis 
                                                 
29 Braun, Capito (2002); pp. 51-70  
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rightly points it out, ’regulation as a half-way house is unlikely to be a common home for a 
deeply divided community.’30  
 
Regulatory activity had initially been supported by the idea that it was in the public interest to 
intervene in the markets due to the assumptions that ’economic markets are extremely fragile 
and apt to operate very inefficiently if left alone […]’31 and that intervention did not produce 
any costs. In this view which is called the ’public interest’ theory regulations’s purpose is to 
achieve certain publicly desired results in circumstances where, for instance, the market 
would fail to yield these32 in the sense that regulation increases social welfare wherever 
monopoly power is abused or maldistribution in the economy detected.33   
 
But empirical research in the 60’s and 70’s made apparent that regulation was not positively 
correlated with any form of market malfunction and that regulation often seems to fail to 
deliver public interest outcomes. Political scientists called attention to the influence of 
different interest groups in the regulatory policy-making process. The regulatory capture 
explains that regulation is most likely to be set up to serve the interests of the regulated and it 
promotes industry profit rather than social welfare.34 The Chicago theory as seen in the 
writings of George Stigler and Sam Peltzman suggested that regulation in large measure is an 
exercise in rent-seeking behavior – that is, firms seek state regulatory intervention in order to 
secure income which otherwise would not be obtained under normal conditions of market 
competition. Regulators come to incorporate the industry’s judgement that regulation is about 
maintaining market stability for existing firms. Obviously the more high-powered incentives 
are at stake, the larger the benefits are for the regulated firm to capture its regulator.35
 
It sounds rather theoretical, but practical examples are present in connection with LRIC price 
regulation which gives regulators a key role in managing entry. On the other hand, as Laffont 
and Tirole point it out, the determination of long-run incremental costs is highly discretionary. 
LRIC preclude operators from making money on access and give them strong incentives to 
favour their competitive affiliates by biasing access against their competitors. These 
incentives call for heavy-handed supervision of the access provider operator. No doubt that 
                                                 
30 Francis (1993); pp. 18. 
31 Posner (1974); pp. 336. 
32 Baldwin and Cave (1999); pp. 19. 
33 Posner (1974); pp. 336. 
34 Peltzman (1976), pp. 211 et s. 
35 Laffont, Tirole (2000); pp. 57. 
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regulation becomes rather costly and also creates scope for interest-group politics in which the 
different parties try to influence the regulators’ exercise of discretion.36  
 
3.2 The cost of sector-specific regulation 
 
Based on the above-described evolution of thought on regulation economists have come to the 
more or less commonly shared agreement that when in doubt as to the proper policy route, 
public decision makers should opt for a market based solution. Hence springs the expression: 
competition is the best regulator.37
 
It has been argued by several commentators that regulatory effects on innovation are 
considered negative. Regulation is supposed to stifle investment and risk taking because ex 
ante price and entry regulations delay rapid adoption of new technology, so incumbents may 
have little incentives to innovate because preemptive strategies become less attractive.38 Also 
they may fear to be unjustifiably regulated in the future making costly innovation a risky 
matter. The recent developments within mobile communications, more precisely the 
introduction of 3G services creates an obvious dilemma for the regulators: they have strong 
incentives to give exlusive rights to some operators in order to facilitate a fast and complete 
rollout of UMTS networks and to reap the monopoly rent. At the same time they do want to 
maintain competition by ensuring access to mobile networks (ex-ante regulatory action to 
mandate access).39 Striking a reasonable balance between these interests is indeed a challenge.  
 
During the consultation on the draft joint ERG/EC approach on appropriate remedies in the 
new regulatory framework, it has been argued by different operators that according to the 
proportionality test regulatory costs should be systematically taken into account, in 
particularly the so-called error costs, i.e. the social losses which arise when the regulatory 
obligations prevent operators from increasing efficiency. NRAs shall consider that mandating 
access does not lead to offsetting costs in the form of reduced investment and innovation.40 
The potential gains from access, for example, may be offset by other obligations that 
                                                 
36 Ibid., pp. 149. 
37 See ibid., pp. 210. 
38 Bourreau, Dogan (2001); pp. 171. 
39 An example for this dilemma can be detected in the decision of OTDR in Ireland obliging the holder of ’A’ 
licence for 3 G mobile services to provide access for MVNOs on a retail minus basis.  
40 Comments submitted to the European Regulatory Group/EC Commission on 19th January, 2004 by Case 
Associates  
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accompany mandated access. It would be rare for NRAs to mandate access without imposing 
a non-discrimination obligation. However, non-discrimination can generate offsetting costs by 
reducing the willingness and ability of operators to develop wholesale deals with service 
providers and deterring price competition by reducing competitive pressure.41
 
To sum up, the costs of regulation, in terms of losses due to capture as described, and 
additionally due to the direct cost related to regulation are considered to be too high.42 This 
means that when there is a choice between general competition law and sector-specific 
regulation, market players tend to prefer the former resulting in intervention only on a case-
by-case basis, closer to a ’let-the-market-rule’ concept.  
 
3.3 Economic concepts in sector-specific regulation of electronic communications 
 
This chapter shall describe economic theory related to regulation which appears relevant due 
to the reason that the inclusion of competition law principles in the new package marks a clear 
step in the direction of an economic dimension based on effective competition.  
 
3.3.1 Effective competition as a goal 
 
Effective competition has many interpretations in economic theory. According to Clark, 
competition is a dynamic process characterised by continuously changing and developing 
conduct of all market participants.43 Effective competition induces the market to perform well 
and prevents firms from rising their prices much more above their costs. Monopoly power 
does the reverse; when the monopolist rises its price above costs the buyers have no 
alternative to turn to. However, a competitive firm has little choice or control, because its 
customers do have a wide range of choice and can turn to other suppliers.  
 
Schumpeter’s thoughts concerning competition were influenced by the role played by 
innovation. He argued that technical progress and the economic growth it caused are far more 
important than static efficiency in resource use. Innovation causes for the entrepreneur to 
make profit for a limited time, but competition is only temporarly suspended whilst the 
                                                 
41  Remedies under the New EU Regulation of the Communications Sector, Case Associates (20 June, 2003)  
42  See e.g. Posner (1969); pp. 635-637 
43 Cox, Jens, Markert (1981); pp. 14. 
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accumulated profit till this point is enough to pay back the risk and the invested capital. This 
profit stimulates market entry in the future to take risks and invest capital.  
 
3.3.2 The concept of effective competition in Communty electronic communications law 
 
Effective competition rises to become a key concept of the NRF. Considering the alleged 
importance of the concept, as a key phrase of triggering sector-specific regulation, and to 
ensure that it is equally applied in different member states, the meaning needs to clarified. 
Remarkably, NRAs shall not impose obligations where they conclude that there is effective 
competition, proving the new regulatory regime to be more flexible that the old one.44 In fact, 
one of the most important aims was when constructing the NRF to ensure that the regulator 
has been given a wide margin of manoeuvre. 
 
 Therefore, Article 16 Framework Directive appears to establish a deregulation mechanism: 
where national regulatory authorities are convinced that a market is effectively competitive 
they shall withdraw existing sector-specific regulation. Unfortunately, the notion of effective 
competition is neither defined by any provision of the Framework Directive nor by any other 
directives of the NRF. However, having a closer look at the Recitals of the Framework 
Directive, Recital 27 seems to make a clear point: significant market power and effective 
competition do not go together.45 It is important to note that according to the case-law of ECJ 
a recital does not form part of the text of a directive, but it may cast light on the interpretation 
of the given legal instrument.46 The Commission in its Guidelines on market analysis and the 
calculation of SMP expressly equates the criterion of effective competition with the lack of 
SMP on a given market.47 Some commentators argue that whilst in the first instance, the 
concept of effective competition seemed to play a significant role in the phasing-out of sector-
specific regulation, the result of the foregoing analysis is sobering: it seems there is no room 
for a distinct concept of effective competition (emphasis added).48 Because of the presence of 
undertakings with single or collective dominance in the majority of the electronic 
                                                 
44 See Article 16 (3)-(5) of Framework Directive 
45 ’It is essential that ex-ante regulatory obligations should only be imposed where there is not effective 
competition, i.e. in markets where there are one or more undertakings with significant market power, […]’. 
46  Cf. ECJ, Casa Fleischhandels-GmbH, [1989] ECR 2789 (2808), para. 31; ECJ, Merck, [1983] ECR 3781 
(3791 et seq.), paras. 10 and 15. 
47 ’[…] a finding that a market is effectively competitive, is, in effect, a finding of an absence of single or 
collective dominance on that market.’ 
48  Koenig, Bartosch, Braun (2002); pp. 331. 
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communications markets, Recital 27 Sentence 1 will prevent a large scale phasing-out of 
sector-specific regulation at this stage.     
 
3.3.3 Natural monopoly: where competition cannot exist 
 
Natural monopoly is the only case where it is more efficient to have a single producer at every 
level of output and it is a particularly good example for the scenario when economies of scale 
are combined with economies of scope. For decades, the absence of competition in 
telecommunications was motivated by the existence of large fixed costs in several parts of the 
network, whose duplication was neither privately profitable nor socially desirable.49 In the 
early days, mobile communications was considered as a natural monopoly precisely because 
frequency spectrum availability was so scarce and the efficiency in using the spectrum 
resource was so poor.50 It therefore seemed reasonable to have the whole frequency spectrum 
foreseen for mobile communications services to be allocated to just one operator. Only with 
the introduction of more efficient cellular systems some countries adopted duopoly market 
structures.51
 
For the purpose of this paper, it is important to note that not all aspects of a supply process or 
network may be naturally monopolistic. An inherent feature of many networks is that there is 
opportunity for ample competition over most parts of the network – yet there is one part of a 
network that is subject to some sort of inevitable monopoly.52 The real task of regulators (at 
least those committed to minimalist regulation53) is to identify those parts of the transmission 
process (or network) that are naturally monopolistic so that these can be regulated by price 
and access regulation while other aspects are left to the influence of competitive forces. As 
described above, at the radio network provision level the scarcity of spectrum could be 
considered as the bottleneck element to which mandating access is a core policy dilemma. 
Gruber argues that this is in spite of the progress the industry made in increasing spectrum 
                                                 
49 Laffont, Tirole (2000); pp. 3. 
50 Gruber (2001); pp. 60. 
51 Gruber and Verboven (2000) have shown that countries that deviated from the monopoly model benefited 
from a consistently higher market growth. This fact is particularly striking for countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
52 Bishop (2004); pp. 14. 
53 Baldwin, Cave (1999); pp. 11. 
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efficiency and in getting substantially larger portions of the frequency spectrum assigned for 
its own purposes.54  
 
However, it is reasonable to conclude that as technological evolution reduces the price of 
mobile communications, mobile networks, which present few if any natural monopoly 
features, become cheaper to deploy than fixed networks.55 In addition the development of 
alternative networks could also be facilitated.  
 
3.3.4 Barriers to entry 
 
Entry barriers appear as an important structural characteristic of the telecom industry in the 
sense that if a network constitutes an essential facility for competitiors in the downstream 
market it is typically due to the existence of entry barriers,56 where the provision of service 
requires a network component that cannot be technically duplicated or only duplicated at a 
cost that makes it uneconomic for competitors. Therefore the competitiveness of an industry 
depends heavily on the ability of potential competitors to enter a specific market.57
 
Entry barriers are defined by Bain58 as ’[…] the advantages of established sellers in an 
industry over potential entrants, these advantages being reflected in the extent to which 
established sellers […] raise their prices above a competitive level without attracting new 
firms to enter the industry.’ According to Recital 11 of the Commission Recommendation on 
Relevant Product and Service Markets, this definition would qualify for structural entry 
barriers which could be detected when the market is characterised by substantial economies of 
scale and/or scope and high sunk costs. 
  
The wholesale mobile access and call origination market is characterised by significant 
barriers to entry at the network level. The current constraints on spectrum availability mean 
that only licensed mobile network operators have an allocation of spectrum. This fact 
constitutes a legal or regulatory barrier which results from administrative measures having 
direct effect on market entry. In addition there are significant sunk costs involved in building 
                                                 
54 Gruber (2001); pp. 69. 
55 Geradin, Kerf (2003); pp. 7. 
56 Mahieu (1998); pp. 31. 
57 Stehmann (1995); pp. 57. 
58 Bain (1956); pp. 3. 
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a mobile network with national coverage.59 Sunk costs are often referred to as a barrier to 
exit.60 Costs are sunk if a firm cannot recoup them when leaving the market. The irreversible 
capital commitments which the existing operators have already undertaken make them stick to 
the market and induce incentive to use strategic behaviour against potential entrants in order 
to secure their own position.  
 
The fact that mobile telecommunications services have experienced drastic developments in 
the recent years calls for further elaboration on entry barriers. In a mobile communications 
network, radio transmission replaces the physical connection between the user and the base 
station. The scarce resource required for radio transmission is the spectrum. Due to 
technological progress, capacity constraints from spectrum scarcity have been gradually 
reduced. As Valletti puts it, “the evolution of the industry is a race for relaxing this 
constraint”.61 Fundamental improvement in the exploitation of the radio spectrum occured 
with the transition from the analogue to the digital technology which convert the voice into 
distinct electronic pulses and transmit them as a digital ’bit stream’, which allows a more 
efficient use of the radio spectrum. Due to available spectrum, access to frequencies for GSM 
in many countries has therefore no longer been a formal entry barrier for operators wishing to 
establish themselves with a new network.62  
 
Spectrum trading seem to relax entry barriers as well, according to David Edmonds, the 
former Director General of Oftel, it could get rid of entry barriers and remove constraints on 
spectrum usage. "Those with more spectrum than they need [...], should be able to sell any 
surplus capacity to the highest bidder just as they would sell land or other assets for which 
others had more use," he said. It will remove barriers to market entry created by blocks of 
frequencies being reserved for particular uses, and promote competition in the supply of 
spectrum-dreived services. Undoubtedly, the spectrum scarcity and the notion that scarcity is 
not scarce are two fundamentally different paradigms and it seems that spectrum trading 
introduces the question: are we struggling between two different paradigms, having difficulty 
letting go of the old and instead attempting to embrace something in the middle?  
                                                 
59 See 5.3.14 NPT market analysis: ’Yet there are relatively high sunk consts associated with the building of a 
commercial network with sufficient coverage, i.e. coverage in more than merely the central Østland region and 
large cities in Norway.’ 
60 Stehmann (1995); pp. 58. 
61 Valletti (2003); pp. 4. 
62 See 5.3.13 NPT market analysis (point 263, 265 and 268); ’In summary NPT does not regard the lack of 
frequencies today as an entry barrier in the market.’  
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3.4 Other market imperfections which trigger economic regulation 
 
There are many more concepts that can increase anti-competitive market structures and that 
are scrutinized by regulatory authorities. In the context of the NRF, the most important market 
failure is that associated with market power, which plays a central role in competition law, as 
well. The idea behind the use of collective dominance as a basis for regulation stems from the 
need to control the action of oligopolists falling short of the notion of single firm 
dominance.63 The concept has been integrated into ex ante regulation by Article 14 (2) 
Framework Directive.  
 
Based on economic theory, oligopolistic competition is detected when a small number of 
players compete on the market. Nevertheless, oligopoly is not about numbers but collective 
market power. This model of market behaviours falls between monopoly and perfect 
competition. A variety of explanatory theories exist trying to embrace different approaches 
(e.g. game theory), however, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to give a thorough overview 
of all the underlying economic assumptions. The main problem for oligopoly theory is that a 
virtually infinite number of assumptions can be made. Each assumption results in a different 
market outcome, ranging from fully competitive behaviour to fully collusive behaviour. It has 
been said that the oligopoly problem is indeterminate, because in oligopoly ’anything can 
happen’.64  
 
3.4.1 Market especially vulnerable  
 
The reason why oligopolistic interdependence should be discussed here, is linked to the fact 
that mobile access and call origination market with few, but large players are especially 
vulnerable for joint dominance to be assessed by the regulator. It may well be the case that no 
operator enjoys a single dominant position anymore in head-to-head competition, but the 
natural structure of the market and certain regulatory obligations increase the risk of collective 
dominance to be found. As Larouche points it out in discussing forms of access to mobile 
networks, the existing GSM 900 operators could also be found to hold a collective dominant 
position, so that a refusal to allow national roaming on reasonable terms would constitute an 
abuse of that collective dominant position (using the essential facilities doctrine). This 
                                                 
63 Bavasso (2004); pp. 103. 
64 Scherer, Ross (1990); pp. 190. 
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approach appears to have been followed recently in Finland, for example. The Finnish 
competition authority found that two Finnish GSM 900 operators acted anticompetitively by 
falling to negotiate national roaming with newcomer Telia Finland, which operates a GSM 
1800 network in a few Finnish cities.65  
 
Another recent example regarding the Irish wholesale access and call origination market is 
provided by the conclusion of ComReg according to which Vodafone and O2 occupy a 
position of collective SMP in the relevant product market under review. ComReg’s view is 
that the essential conditions warranting a finding of collective dominance, as set out in the 
judgement of the CFI in Airtours and as set out in the Commission’s SMP Guidelines, appear 
to be met in relation to the relevant market for wholesale mobile access and call origination.66 
Market entry did not occur (despite the pent up demand for wholesale mobile access) or was 
not effective in the past due to the behaviour of existing MNOs. This indicates a dominant 
oligopoly that acts as a deterrant to firms that would in principle be interested in entering the 
market. It is important to see that network operators could be jointly found pursuing a certain 
strategic choice regarding wholesale access services: such as denying access for certain type 
of service providers or denying national roaming for a smaller operator.  
 
3.4.2 Would oligopolistic interdependence suffice? 
 
An oligopoly is characterised by a positive reaction curve, i.e. if one operator changes a 
parameter, this will immediately induce competitors to react (so-called oligopolistic 
interdependence).67 Therefore in a market with relatively few players, substantial barriers to 
entry and very similar market shares, joint dominance is much more likely to occur. It is 
important to note that under this scenario competition may be limited but not necessarily.68 As 
Gilbert puts it ’[…] a predictive model of how firms behave [in an oligopolistic situation] may 
be no easier to construct than a model of the weather based on the formation of water 
droplets’.69 In principle, the mobile market being an oligopoly can develop in two opposite 
ways – towards joint dominance or to an equal control oligopoly with effective competition.70  
                                                 
65 Larouche (2000); pp. 371. 
66 ComReg market analysis (2003), pp. 58. et seq 
67 Groebel (2003); pp. 444. 
68 Mahieu (2003); presentation on Collective Dominance  
69 See Gilbert (1989), p. 478. 
70 Groebel (2003); pp. 450.  
 20
Nevertheless, a fundamental question needs clarification: what determines the dividing link 
between market structures that simply have few suppliers, i.e. oligopolies, and market 
structures with joint dominance?  
 
Competition can be impeded in practice due to the fact that the companies have links such as 
agreements for cooperation, or interconnection. However, no structural links are necessary to 
exist, it is sufficient economic link if there is the kind of interdependence which often comes 
about in oligopolistic situations. As the CFI pointed out in Gencor:71
 
’[…] the relationship of interdependence existing between the parties to a tight oligopoly 
within which, in a market with the appropriate characteristics, in particular in terms of market 
concentration, transparency and product homogeneity, those parties are in a position to 
anticipate one another’s behaviour and are therefore strongly encouraged to align their 
conduct in the market, in particular in such a way as to maximise their joint profits by 
restricting production with a view to increasing prices.’  
 
Key in this definition is the interdependence between firms in a tight oligopoly, which 
encourages them to align their conduct in such a way as to maximise joint profits. In 
economic theory this is known as ‘tacit collusion’.72 The lesson to learn here is that the mere 
existence of oligopolistic interdependence (and a certain extent of output restriction) is not 
sufficient for a collusive outcome to obtain. Oligopolistic interdependence exists in any 
market with few firms, and output is often lower that it would be in perfect competition (e.g. 
in the Cournot model). However, this does not always mean that firms are maximising joint 
profits through tacit collusion.   
 
3.4.3 Conditions for Tacit Collusion 
 
A remarkable judgement of the CFI73 in Airtours/First Choice identified collective dominance 
with the economists’ concept of tacit collusion and clarified three elements for collective 
dominance, or tacit collusion to be reached. It should be noted that both ComReg and Oftel 
                                                 
71 Case T-102/96 Gencor v. European Commission 25 March 1999, para. 267. 
72 Niels (2001); pp. 168. 
73 Case T-342/99, 6 June 2002 Airtours v. Commission 
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has investigated the notion of joint dominance along the guidelines of this judgement, albeit 
with different outcomes.  
 
First each member of the dominant oligopoly must have the ability to know how the other 
members are behaving in order to monitor whether or not they are adopting the common 
policy. In the Court’s view, it is necessary, therefore, that there is sufficient market 
transparency for all firms in the oligopoly to be aware, sufficiently and quickly, of the way in 
which the other firms’ market conduct is evolving. Second, any tacit co-ordination must be 
sustainable over time. Implicit, is the view that a retaliatory mechanism of some kind is 
necessary, so that any firm that deviates from the co-ordinated price (there will always be the 
temptation to ‘cheat’ by undercutting) would be met by competitive reaction by the other 
firms. Third, it is necessary that existing and future competitors, as well as customers, do not 
undermine the results expected from the common policy.   
 
These are essential requirements to establish tacit co-ordination, but collective dominance 
may be determined by a wide range of factors.74 Of course the identification of one or more 
characteristics of a checklist is not determinative of the existence of tacit collusion. Airtours 
established in clear terms that it is the interaction of the criteria set out above (and the 
interplay of the various elements) that determines the existence of collective dominance. 
Much doubt has been expressed whether NRAs would be able to carry out such a 
sophisticated assessment. Somewhat inevitably, an application of the concept of collective 
dominance in the context of regulation tends towards a mechanical checklist approach which 
the CFI has unequivocally rejected in favour of a more nuanced analysis.75
 
To sum up, it does not follow that because a market is oligopolistic the firms will tacitly 
collude. Indeed, the market characteristics described above that make tacit collusion possible 
and sustainable are not likely to be widely met in practice. The most difficult task will be for 
NRAs to apply these principles in the appropriate cases.      
 
 
                                                 
74 See Annex II of the Framework Directive 
75 Bavasso (2004); pp. 104. 
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4 Toward general competition law in mobile telephony  
 
4.1 Regulatory forbearance: refraining from applying regulatory conditions  
 
’Unlike old soldiers, regulatory agencies seem not only never to die, but never to fade 
away.’76
                         Barry M. Mitnick 
 
The starting point is that it is undoubtedly very difficult for any organisation, particularly a 
regulatory agency, seriously to question whether some of its core activities are really 
necessary. The fact that the NRF paves the way for gradual phasing out of sector-specific 
regulation, thus creates a countervailing external pressure for NRAs to exercise regulatory 
forbearance.  
 
The term regulatory forbearance is often used in the sense of the withdrawal of regulation 
from some activity (wider concept of forbearance). However, following US regulatory 
practice, a more specific concept of regulatory forbearance has been promoted under which it 
can refrain from applying certain regulatory conditions (narrower concept of forbearance).77   
 
In principle, given the growing network and platform competition, higher potential for 
withdrawal of regulation can be detected in mobile telephony. More precisely, wholesale 
mobile access and call origination market serves as an interesting case study for exploring 
regulatory forbearance in practice.  
 
In discussing economic regulation, the standard picture is that there are the vast majority of 
industries which may be subject to regulation on the grounds of health and safety, labour, 
technical and environmental standards, but which, in economic terms, have no ex ante 
regulation and are only subject to ex post competition policy. A small set of utility service 
industries, however, operate under ex-ante regulation. The degree too which these markets are 
regulated largely depend on bottleneck elements.78 The reform potentials on the level of 
                                                 
76 Mitnick (1980); pp. 416. 
77 Stern (2004); pp. 274. 
78 ibid. pp. 276. Stern differentiates between normal markets, markets/industries with limited competition 
(brewer’s contracts with tied public houses), markets/industries with very limited competition (Yellow pages), 
industries/markets with high degree of market power (research-based pharmaceuticals), competitive segments of 
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network infrastructure and the remaining regulatory problems centre around the basic 
question whether the providers of network services need access to a network infrastructure 
with characteristics of a monopolistic bottleneck facility.79 Competitive network 
infrastructures do not create regulatory problems. Due to network alternatives the problem of 
avoiding discriminatory access disappears, incentives do exist for efficient allocation of 
network capacities.  
 
4.1.1 Proportionality and procedural forbearance80
 
In my views, the principle of proportionality can be facilitated as a tool for procedural 
forbearance in accordance with imposing ex ante obligations. One of the primary objective of 
the NRF was to introduce flexibility in the imposition of remedies on SMP operators. If the 
old regime could be described from an “all or nothing” approach, then the greatest innovation 
of the NRF has been the “one, some or all” perspective. This change represents a new 
departure in comparison with the old framework under which NRAs had to impose on the 
SMP operators the full set of obligations provided in the directives without being able to 
choose the most appropriate ones.  
 
The Access Directive provides a menu of five ascending behavioural obligations81 to rely on 
whilst let the proportionality principle be the ultimate guide for regulatory intervention. 
However, a number of practitioners were concerned about the ERG Common Position on the 
approach to appropriate remedies because the document dismisses the application of single 
remedies as inadequate. This document aims to ensure a consistent and harmonized approach 
to the application of remedies by NRAs in line with the Community law principle of 
proportionality and as such will be taken into account by NRAs as a soft-law instrument. The 
recommended approach in order to choose a suitable remedy is to recognize the root causes of 
a competition problem, gain knowledge about the global market constellation and the source 
of market power. The document seems to impose multiple remedies in order to deal with a 
                                                                                                                                                        
industries with monopoly (network) elements (electricity generation), bottleneck elements of competitive 
segments of industries with monopoly (network) elements (mobile call termination), monopoly network and 
related elements of infrastructure industries (wholesale broadband) 
79 Knieps (2004); pp. 22. 
80 The term ‘procedural’ has been introduced by Dr Ian Walden during an unstructured interview for the purpose 
of this paper held on the 7th of July, 2004 in London 
81 De Streel (2003), pp. 535 et seq: transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, access to network 
facilities, price control and cost accounting 
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certain competition problem and thus, doubts have been raised whether cure would be worse 
than the disease.    
 
To what extent the principle of proportionality will go far enough in reality to ensure efficient 
and not over inclusive regulation seems a challenge for regulators. In the given area of law, 
proportionality shall be seen as a constraint imposed on NRAs which has important 
implications for practitioners, since in all contexts it is possible to question the adequacy of 
actions undertaken by NRAs by claiming that they lack proportionality. 
 
4.2 All or nothing: bottleneck approach in ex-ante intervention 
 
The concept is based on the idea that regulation should apply as narrowly and directly as 
possible to certain segments of electronic communications markets and thus increasingly 
delegate competencies to general competition law.82 The question of localizing those 
segments is inevitably linked to defining different parts of a network.  
 
The provision of a telecommunication service often require combining of multiple elements. 
A long-distance phone call may flow through the local exchange carrier’s local loop, 
switches, and interoffice transmission facilities at the originating and terminating ends and 
through a long-distance company’s trunk lines in between.83 In this scenario the incumbent 
operator controls the local bottleneck and faces competition by one or several competitors, the 
entrants, in the long-distance market. The entrants need access to the local network in order to 
reach end users. From a social viewpoint, the presence of entrants in the competitive market 
may be desirable for several reasons. Entrants often offer a differentiated service not offered 
by the incumbents. They may also provide existing services at a lower cost. Last, entrants 
may force the incumbent to produce more efficiently.84 Whether the analogy of the unbundled 
local loops of a fixed network operator can be applied to the network elements of a mobile 
operator to enable MVNOs to provide downstream services will be discussed later in this 
paper. Although the difference in the history of the fixed and mobile markets is widely 
recognised (an often cited argument), one can insist that mobile operators control bottleneck 
facilities (e.g. mobile termination), access to scarce resources (spectrum), and that companies 
                                                 
82  Imenga et a. (2001); pp. 27. 
83  Laffont, Tirole (2000); pp. 97. 
84  See ibid., pp. 100. 
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requesting access to these networks invariably find themselves in an unfavourable bargaining 
position. 
 
In sum, the bottleneck approach ensures that the bottleneck market is regulated so that the 
necessary input for adjacent markets can be obtained by all competitors.85 However, the 
concept proves to be too inflexible, since it only provides the choice between regulation 
forever and no regulation at all. Very often regulation is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, in 
fact, some commentators argue that the essential point about the NRF is not the question of 
whether there is more or less regulation, but what type of regulation is needed.86    
 
4.3      The notion of ’Essential Facilities’ 
 
A problem that relates to monopolistic bottlenecks is the concept of essential facilities in EC 
competition law. In the leading case Stena Sealink87 the Commission defined the essential 
facilities as ’a facility or infrastructure without access to which competitors cannot provide 
services to their customers.’ The sriking point is that there is no general duty to share essential 
facilities, but denial of access to essential facilities must be justified by qualified criteria, or if 
it is not, then the refusal to supply is abusive within the meaning of Article 82 EC. 
 
For the purpose of this paper, it should be highlighted that cases that raise issues of essential 
facilities may include mobile network operators that provide both wholesale and retail mobile 
access services.88 The emphasis highlights that not only a single undertaking, but a several 
undertakings jointly may control essential facilities access to which is indispensable to 
provide downstream services. In order to play a competitive role as a service provider (or 
even network operator in an early stage of roll-out) in this market, a newcomer is undoubtedly 
dependent on the use of the spectrum already allocated to existing network operator(s) and the 
use of at least some network elements of the same network operator(s). However, as more 
networks are potential alternatives, the less likely that they could fall within the notion of 
                                                 
85  Ibid supra note 83 
86  Krüger, Mauro (2003); pp. 35.  
87  Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink, Commission Decision EC (94/19) ’The owner of an essential facility which 
uses its power in one market in order to protect or strengthen its position in another related market, in particular, 
by refusing to grant access to a competitor, or by granting access on less favourable terms than those of its own 
services, and thus imposing a competitive disadvantage on its competitior, infringes Article 82 […]’  
88  Temple Lang (1994); pp. 477. 
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essential facilities, unless qualified criteria are met, such as an emergence of a “new product”, 
as described later.  
 
Whilst the notion of essential facilities has been developed through case law, the Commission 
sought to specify the scope of it in the context of the telecoms sector in the Access Notice.89 
The Access Notice specifies that an essential facility a) must be “generally essential in order 
for companies to compete” or “essential for reaching customers” on the related market and b) 
“cannot be replicated by any reasonable means” so that the “refusal of access must lead to the 
proposed activities being made either impossible or seriously and unavoidably 
uneconomic”.90 It has introduced further conditions, namely the requirement of available 
capacity (the capacity of the facility must be sufficient for both the access provider and the 
access seeker) and the requirement of no objective justification to refuse access on the 
controlling operator’s side. On this point, the Commission indicates that relevant justifications 
may include the fact that a facility owner who has invested in the introduction of a new 
product may need to have sufficient opportunity to use the facility to place that product on the 
market (which is an undoubtedly justifiable argument in the context of the 3G landscape)91.  
 
Having discussed the relevance of the doctrine to our topic, the question is what conditions 
must a network fulfill in order to qualify as a genuinely essential facility? The answer more 
likely to be found with a closer look into the relevant case law.   
 
4.3.1 Access to ’Essential facilities’ in the light of EC case law 
 
4.3.1.1 Latest development of conditions for mandated access   
 
IMS Health: the notion of hypothetical market 
Prior to the Commission’s decision in NDC Health/IMS Health, cases in the European Union 
dealing with refusals to deal by dominant companies, involved situations where two distinct 
markets could be identified. In this case, the Commission did not attempt to maintain that 
there were two markets, one upstream market for the brick structures and one downstream or 
                                                 
89 Notice 98/C 265/02 on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector, recital 87. et. seq. 
90   Ibid. recital 68 and 91(a) 
91   See also the Opinion of Adv. Gen. Jacobs in Case C-7/97 Bronner v. Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791 
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related market for regional sales data. However, Advocate General Tizzano maintained the 
two-market approach, but interpreted the notion of market in a broad manner.92 He argues that 
markets for inputs can be identified without such inputs actually being marketed as such. 
Upstream market is considered as a potential one, in the sense that operating within it is a 
monopoly undertaking which decides not to market independently the inputs in question 
(notwithstanding that there is an actual demand for them), reserving them exclusively for its 
own use in a downstream market, thereby restricting or eliminating competition in that 
downstream market.93  
 
In its judgement the Court of Justice agreed with Advocate General Tizziano, stating that for 
the purposes of the application of the earlier case-law, it is sufficient that a potential market of 
indispensable product such as the brick structure can be identified. The notion of potential or 
hypothetical market94 was not the only issue argued by Advocate General Tizziano and ruled 
by the ECJ in connection with access to essential facilities. The Advocate General returned to 
the ’new product’ requirement of Magill95, in the sense that, in order to qualify the refusal  
abusive within the meaning of Article 82 EC, emergence of a new product has to be 
prevented. The undertaking requesting access to a product protected by exclusive right (let it 
be copyright or ownership rights in tangible property) should not intend to limit itself 
essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on the secondary market by the 
owner of the exclusive right, but intends to provide services not offered by the owner of the 
right and for which there is a potential consumer demand. This approach has been criticised 
by some commentators, arguing that the consumers would certainly benefit from having a 
choice of different derivative products, not just the product of the access provider, even if all 
these products present the same features.96
 
Oscar Bronner 
Under the language of Oscar Bronner97, refusal is abusive if the following conditions are met: 
                                                 
92 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, General Advocate’s 
Opinion of 2 October, 2003 
93  Ibid. point 57. 
94 Case C-418/01, Judgement of the Court 29 April, 2004, point. 44. 
95 The three exceptional circumstances found by the Court in Magill were, in summary, the following: (1) there 
was no actual of potential substitute for a weekly guide – a product with strong potential consumer demand – and 
the copyright holder prevented the emergence of a new product that it did not himself offer (’new product’ 
requirement; (2) there was no objective justification for the refusal of the copyright holder to license Magill; and 
(3) the TV companies were reserving to themselves the secondary market for weekly television guides. 
96  Igartua Arregui (2003); pp. 858. 
97  Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag, 1998 E.C.R. I-779. 
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1) The refusal to access the facility is likely to eliminate all competition in the relevant 
market; 
2) Such refusal is not capable of being objectively justified; and 
3) The facility itself is indispensable to carrying on business, inasmuch as there is no 
actual or potential substitute in existence for that facility.    
 
Looking at the three requirements defined by the ECJ in the Bronner case, the notion of no 
viable alternative poses a further question which is whether the access seeker could 
reasonably duplicate the existing infrastructure and thus save the access provider from 
mandated access. 
   
4.3.1.2 Is the facility indispensable to carrying on business?  
 
The ECJ gave concrete assessment of the relevant circumstances in which resources can be 
deemed ‘indispensable’. In setting aside the argument made by the undertaking seeking access 
(according to which its own situation had to be considered when assessing whether another, 
competing distribution channel could be established), the ECJ appraised the economic 
viability of duplicating a facility from the standpoint of ‘another large daily newspaper’.98 
Access can be mandated, however, only if there is no possibility for the access seeker to 
increase its circulation to a level similar to that reached by the incumbent and to amortise the 
costs of the distribution network with the profits from the larger circulation.99   
 
What has been clarified by the Court and the Advocate General regarding the criterion of 
indispensability is only that it is not the turnover of the small circulation newspaper publisher 
requesting access which determines the essential character of the facility, but also the inability 
of even a hypothetical investor enjoying sufficient financial strength to recoup initial losses 
caused by the establishment of a second (lucrative-to-be) network. Therefore, as several 
authors argued, the judgement in Bronner restricts the scope of the essential facility doctrine 
                                                 
98 See ibid point 46. ’For such access to be capable of being regarded as indispensable, it would be necessary at 
the very least to establish […] that it is not economically viable to create a second home-delivery scheme for the 
distribution of daily newspapers with a circulation comparable to that of the daily newspapers distributed by the 
existing scheme.’ 
99 Nihoul, Rodford (2004); pp. 482. 
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and does not take into account the fact that markets may be saturated, making the roll-out of a 
second network unavoidably uneconomic. 100  
 
4.3.1.3 Elimination of all competition 
 
Under the essential facilities doctrine, access to an infrastructure is granted because that 
infrastructure is essential for the development of competition on the secondary market. In 
comparison with the Bronner judgement according to which all competition in the 
downstream market would be eliminated by means of refusing access to the person requesting 
such access, the wording of the Access Notice however does not explicitly require all 
competition to be eliminated on the downstream market; it regards it to be sufficient if the 
owner of the infrastructure either fails to satisfy demand on an existing market, or blocks the 
emergence of a potential new product, or impedes competition on an existing or potential 
market.101 The Access Notice has therefore been criticised for following an over-
interventionist approach.102 Nevertheless, the requirement of ’eliminating all competition’ is a 
difficult one to meet, due to the fact that mobile access markets are usually characterised by 
two-to-five network operators which undoubtedly allows certain level of competition to exist 
by definition.   
 
4.3.1.4 Objective justification 
 
The crucial question not yet clarified by the ECJ, is that of to what extent the owner of an 
infrastructure can be required to share the available capacity between himself and his 
competitors. Capacity constraint as an objective justification seems relevant to discuss in 
connection with the mobile access market.  
 
The first issue is how to allocate capacity among access seeking service providers, if there is 
not enough capacity to satisfy the needs of all of them. Under the competition rules non-
discrimination principle has to be complied with. The second possible scenario is how to 
allocate capacity among service providers and the access controller undertaking. The crucial 
                                                 
100 Bartosch (2002); pp. 145. 
101 Access Notice, para. 91 lit. c.  
102 Nikolinakos (1999); pp. 402-403. 
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question is whether the network owner should give up part of the available capacity to provide 
access to its competitors.  
 
The level of competition on the adjacent market seems to be the reasonable benchmark for 
assessment. If the undertaking controlling the facility is only one of the players on that 
adjacent market and competition is developed, there is probably less reason to mandate access 
by restricting the capacity allocated to the network owner. By contrast, if a dominant 
undertaking intends to secure its market power on the secondary market, it is more likely that 
in order to develop competition, service provision should be favoured.  
 
4.3.1.5 Concluding remarks: competitive concerns in Bronner and IMS Health 
 
In sum, the doctrine has been examined in great detail, because it is especially representative 
of how competition law, in particular as it is applied in the electronic communications sector, 
is evolving whilst sector-specific regulation is gradually phased out. It is not too difficult to 
envisage that those market segments which do not warrant sector-specific intervention any 
longer, will be subject to the exclusive application of competition rules. 
 
Based on the case law to determine whether a facility is essential the following test seems 
adequate to use: 
 
1) lack of access to a facility must have an effect on competition on the end-user 
market (i.e. there is no second or third such facility to reach end-users, in other 
words no active substitute is available)103; 
2) it must not be economically viable for an objective competitor comparable in size 
to the holder of the alleged essential facility to duplicate the network. 
 
Once that seems to be the proven case, the access provider would violate Article 82 EC if 
there was no objective justification for a refusal to provide access.   
 
Whilst the justified ground for intervention is usually an anti-competitive behaviour of the 
dominant firm, be it price squeeze, refusal to deal or discrimination, in contrast, in Bronner 
                                                 
103 Knieps (2004); pp. 23. 
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and IMS market power is an inevitable consequence of essentiality (indispensability) as the 
key competitive concern.104 This analysis would imply that the ground for intervention would 
thus be more a structural market defect. 
 
5 Bottlenecks in mobile communications?   
 
In the NRF the finding of SMP seems to be the only decisive factor for triggering ex-ante 
regulation, therefore the Annex II to the Framework Directive and the SMP Guidelines 
contain a number of demonstrative criteria which should be taken into account when NRAs 
conduct market analyses. However, the bottleneck approach, as described in chapter 4.2, helps 
to highlight that the distinguishing criterion for identifying the remaining need for sector-
specific regulation is often the question whether access to these facilities is an indispensable 
prerequisite for offering a complementary service on the downstream market.105 This 
phenomenon very clearly calls for regulation on an access market, if input should be obtained 
in order to improve competitive outcome of the corresponding retail market.  
 
To flesh out this structural approach, comparison shall be made to the recent developments of 
sector specific intervention in the voice call termination on individual mobile networks under 
the auspieces of the NRF. Among many other NRAs throughout Europe, ComReg believes 
that an MNO enjoys a de facto monopoly position over termination of voice calls on its 
network. At present, the mechanism of supply or demand substitution is not effective in the 
market due to the absence of alternatives.106  
   
The network of each MNO constitutes a separate wholesale market for termination of mobile 
voice calls on that network and concluding that currently no viable competitive substitutes 
exist, it must be acknowledged that the concept of essentiality is substituted to traditional 
dominance analysis in bottleneck cases: the apparently the firm is in a dominant position 
because it controls a certain facility.107 This approach in sector-specific regulation very much 
resembles the one discussed in connection with competition law.  
 
                                                 
104 Larouche (2000); pp. 207. 
105 Knieps (2004); pp. 23. 
106 Consultation on Remedies – Wholesale voice call termination on individual mobile networks (8th June, 2004) 
107 See Larouche (2000); pp. 208. 
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It can be seen that the lack of viable alternative (e.g. no other alternative than terminating the 
call on the network the end-user being called has subscribed to) have an affect on the 
secondary market in the form of high termination charges, set above costs. Obviously the 
conditions for a monopoly are met in the case of mobile termination charges, regardless of the 
fact that mobile telephony as such (or other mobile submarket) is characterised by large 
number of operators with head-to-head competition for the market. It is important to see that 
the calling party pays externality and technical impossibilities for viable alternatives makes 
each network operator a monopolist on its own network. The structural problem of 
termination charges as a bottleneck case clearly calls for adequate price regulation. As Sverre 
Holt points it out an ex ante approach should be (more) confined to structural market defects, 
thus paving the way for effective competition.108    
 
5.1 Access and call origination markets from a comparative perspective 
 
One needs to take into account the fact that, in the absence of some form of historical 
regulatory intervention, there would be few if any access markets. This constitutes a clear 
departure from other non-network based industries. As the following comparison will show 
that countries with strong service provision and well-defined access market on the wholesale 
level have been stimulated by regulatory intervention.   
 
5.1.1 Identification of the market 
 
In connection with the ’regulatory fine tuning’, the Commission Recommendation 
differentiates between three wholesale markets in mobile telephony in which ex ante 
regulation may be warranted.109 Access and call origination on public mobile telephone 
networks qualifies as market 15, however the Commission in its Explanatory Memorandum 
has stated that this market is unlikely to be included in future revisions of the 
Recommendation.  
 
                                                 
108 Response to ERG/EC remedies consultation by Telenor ASA (19 January, 2004) 
109 Commission Recommendation C(2003)497 of February 11, 2003 on relevant product and service markets 
within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services 
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This statement has induced practitioners to rightly argue that the criteria for identifying this 
particular market as a relevant market should heavily depend on the assessment of the 
effectiveness of competition law alone in addressing the market failures concerned. Only 
markets where competition law is not considered sufficient by itself to redress market failures 
and to ensure effective competition over a foreseeable time horizon should be indentified for 
potential ex ante intervention. Based on this phenomenon, it is evident that the first chance of 
market 15 to escape from regulation is not to be identified as a relevant market at all, once 
structural market characteristics justify such a regulatory forbearance. If a sufficient number 
of undertakings can be detected behind existing entry barriers, but with diverging cost 
structures and facing price-elastic market demand, the structural characteristics themselves 
may push the market towards effective competition. As Oftel concluded in its market analysis, 
overall prices are still on a downward trend and the changes in market share suggest that 
consumers do respond to changes in price and other factors. It should be noted that the 
introduction of number portability provided end-users with an effective tool to switch 
operators and thus react to pricing.  
 
5.1.2 Definition of the product market 
 
The group of products and services under consideration in this document consists of 
wholesale services provided over public mobile telephone networks. Wholesale services are 
ones sold and purchased by communications providers rather than end users. The wholesale 
services is this market enable communications providers to sell to end users the ability to use 
mobile networks and the ability to make calls (including voice calls and SMS) from those 
networks.  From the end users’s point of view there is no demarcation between access and call 
origination, thus customer’s integrated demand for access and outgoing calls determines that 
access and call origination come bundled at the wholesale level, as well.  
 
A chief feature of all market definitions reviewed for this thesis is that precise market 
definition regarding 3G services is unclear at present, therefore 3G network services will not 
form a separate market at this stage of their development.  
 
The geographical scope of the market is national due to an uniform pricing policy and a lack 
of demand and supply side substitutability from markets outside of the individual countries.  
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 In defining the relevant product market for wholesale access and call origination services on 
the basis of substitutable services, the followings will have to be addressed: 
 
- wether call origination, MVNO access and other wholesale services provided over a 
mobile network belong to the same relevant market; and 
- whether self-supply should be included in the relevant product market, together with 
wholesale services provided to third parties.  
 
Regarding the first question, it is important to note that a variety of business models exist in 
connection with access to mobile networks, but all depend on the very fact that only MNOs 
provide input for these business models. Input itself might differ, for example, indirect access 
operators require call origination; MVNOs require access to the radio access network; while 
independent service providers require access to airtime. Their smallest common demominator 
is the capability to satisfy retail consumer’s needs, thus supporting the argument for demand-
side subsitutability. From the supply-side perspective any operator providing a call origination 
service to indirect access operators could in theory, where capacity is available, switch with 
relative ease to providing access to an MVNOs. Based on these assumptions, NRAs are of the 
preliminary view that the relevant product market, therefore, consist of all wholesale access 
and call origination services that could be offered over an MNO’s network.   
 
The second question arose in those jurisdictions where no wholesale services were currently 
provided, except in the form of self-supply by vertically integrated operators. On the basis of 
potential market transactions for the wholesale provision, it is possible to construct a 
hypothetical market which is consistent with the relevant Communiy jurisprudence as 
Advocate General Tizziano described this issue in its opinion in IMS. In considering whether 
or not self-supply of access by vertically integrated MNOs should be treated in the same way 
as the provision of such services to third party, ComReg’s preliminary view is that this 
approach is the appropriate one.   
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5.2 Various forms of access – fragmented mobile value chain 
 
There are various means to access the mobile network at the wholesale level:110  
 
1) access for operators without their own infrastructure (third party operators, such as 
service provider arrangements). The service providers purchase airtime from network 
operators for reselling it to their contracted customers. Every call is routed in the same 
way as the MNO’s own customer’s calls, scope of differentation from the MNO’s 
downstream services can be obtained in customer care, invoicing and billing 
arrangements. Though they sell subscription/pre-paid cards in their own name and 
with their own prices, the substantial part of the technical service production is, 
however, carried out by the network operator. Two categories of service providers 
exist, tied service providers (TSPs) and independent service providers (ISPs). TSPs 
sell branded subscriptions and calls of their parent network, though the customer’s 
contract is not with the MNO, but the TSP itself. ISPs make up the other category of 
airtime resellers, but they are not tied to individual network providers, therefore, can 
offer a choice between networks. Once again, the customer’s contract is directly with 
the ISP itself.  
 
2) MVNO means access for an operator that does not own a radio network, but has its 
own switches and core network. An MVNO must have its own arrangements for 
routing the calls to and from subscribers in other networks (mobile or fix), but does 
not have its own access network.111 Services to customers are based on the 
management of the combination of virtual and real network elements. Tele2 as an 
MVNO in Norway, for example, has its own IMSI code, its own network code (MNC) 
and offer its own subsription (SIM card). The additional (technical) freedom that 
MVNOs have and the full control of the customer provide greate scope for innovation 
in tariff packaging, billing and introduction of new innovative services. As mobile 
network capacity and data applications increase with the development of the high-
                                                 
110 Based on the explanation of Mr. Petter Bliksrud (Telenor AS) whom I had interviewed for the purpose of 
understanding technical aspects of access issues better.  
111 ComReg’s definition of an MVNO, is an organisation operating a physical network infrastructure comprising 
at a minimum a mobile switching centre, home location register and authentication centre, having its own unique 
mobile network code with distinct IMSI and E.164 number series, and issuing its own branded SIM-cards (or 3G 
mobile equivalents), but without a mobile radio access network. See ComReg market analysis (2004), pp. 72 
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speed mobile market, it is likely that this form of access will grow and evolve 
accordingly.   
 
3) The third access is national roaming, which provides access for another network 
operator who has its own radio network covering part of the country. Access is then 
usually confined to the areas where the accessing operator does not have its own 
coverage. The difference between 2) and 3) is that MVNO arrangement provides 
access to the whole radio network, whilst national roaming is limited to a certain part 
of it. Teletopia, a Norwegian operator with its own (radio) network infrastructure, has 
built a GSM 1800 network in Oslo and is entitled to access Telenor’s network via 
national roaming, to give better coverage for its end users.  
 
Based on the above findings, two separate categories of external providers can be found in the 
wholesale market: third party operators (SPs and MVNOs) and new network operators 
demanding roaming facilities. A further differentiation can be made regarding point 2), if we 
wish to include indirect access providers into the category of virtual network provision (prefix 
or fixed routing). To a certain extent this service provider is operating a virtual network as 
well, by obtaining a carrier selection code. The call is originated on a mobile network and 
frouted according to the agreement between indirect access provider and the mobile network 
operator. The indirect access provider pays the MNO for the network element used and have 
the freedom of choice in the packaging and tariffing of services and there is a scope for 
adding in new value added services. 
 
The description above highlight the possible fragmention of the value chain with network 
operators at the core, feeding into basic service providers, with indirect access providers, 
MVNOs and value added service providers making up the outer layers. The following 
diagram provides an overview of the above description:  
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The diagram includes the category of value added service providers who could offer a range 
of new services (new content services or m-business applications) over the various access 
forms. Given the bandwith required to deliver these services, they require enhanced GSM or 
3G networks. 
  
5.3 Mandating access as a core policy dilemma  
 
In a liberalized setting, the regulator is no longer overseeing one physical network with a 
single owner providing services over it. The picture is far more complex.112 Ensuring access, 
is thus the core regulatory mandate. For the purpose of discussion, this paper is concerned 
exclusively with supplier access, namely the possibility for a supplier to gain access to 
networks in order to offer products or services. The former incumbent setting is of limited 
relevance in the mobile context, whereby the market has become competitive overall right 
from the beginning. However, problems of access are bound to remain as long as network 
provision as such is a fundamental input for mobile telephony, though in some jurisdictions is 
not marketed at all, as a distinct service.  
 
                                                 
112  Larouche (2000); pp. 368. 
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Access to mobile networks has the potential to stimulate greater competition in the mobile 
market by providing consumers with more choice and possibly lower prices. In general, 
network operators may choose to negotiate such agreements where it is in their commercial 
interest to do so. However, regulatory intervention may be an alternative way of addressing 
the issue. MNOs would argue right away that such a mandated access may not generate 
appreciable consumer benefits, because a new downstream competitor would simply lead to 
reduction in the market share of existing firms, with few tangible benefits for end users. 
Furthermore, any potential gains from access may be offset by reducing the network 
operator’s incentive to invest. Hotly debated issue, indeed, and from the point of view of 
MNOs it can be summarised as the closer access is to the retail level, the more limited the 
margin for which competition takes place and the smaller the potential gains are.113 Therefore, 
the MVNO concept (or enhanced service provision) is more likely to be a win-win solution 
for both the access-provider and the access-seeker, since the investment to be made by 
prospective MVNOs are substantial and not materially different from the investment made by 
MNOs except for the investment in base station sites and radio infrastructure. This form of 
access is closer to the network level, as it widens the distribution of quasi network services.114 
It should be noted here that the divisions between the various classes of service providers are 
often blurred but, in general, the higher up the value chain the SP operates, the greater the 
potential customer benefits in terms of innovation and choice. This could gain importance if 
we remember that the NRF applies a strong consumer welfare approach.   
 
Recalling the outcomes of Bronner, some practitioners argue that access obligations should 
only be imposed, if it can be established that refusal to supply access is reasonably likely to 
prevent an equally or more efficient service provider from entering the relevant downstream 
market.115 The objective of access obligations is not to stimulate wholesale competition or 
entry per se but to improve competition in the retail market. Therefore, any alleged exclusion 
of a downstream competitor must be evaluated in terms of its impact on retail competition, 
retail prices and consumer choice. This approach is based on the fact that demand for 
wholesale access and call origination principally derives from the equivalent retail service, 
                                                 
113 See supra, note 46, pp. 24. 
114 Mobile Virtual Network Operators: Oftel inquiry into what MVNOs could offer consumers (1999)  
115 Ibid., pp. 23.  
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competitive conditions at the retail level are highly relevant in determining the scope for 
which types of access and call origination services are required at the wholesale level.116   
 
5.4 The notion of access 
 
A lot has been said so far about access, but what do we really mean by access? Under the old 
regulatory framework there was no precise definition of what was meant by access whilst 
interconnection agreements essentially aimed to ensure that the networks of the parties to the 
agreement are linked in such a way that the customers of one party can both communicate 
with those of the other party and obtain services provided on the other party’s network by the 
other party or by a third party.117  
 
Several changes have been introduced in the NRF with regard to access. A more general 
perspective has been taken in the Access Directive, where access-related obligations are 
extended to all facilities or resources necessary to provide electronic communications 
services. Contrary to the old regulatory framework, interconnection has become one among 
many issues relating to access.  
 
As the scope of access has been broadened, a precise definition was given: access is the use of 
an operator’s network infrastructure by service providers who do not have their own 
networks.118 As a result of the fact that regulation is no longer dependant on the nature of the 
network, access obligations can be imposed on a number of different gateways. This will 
cover national and international roaming to ensure, in particular, the interoperability of end-
to-end services to users. The provision for mandatory national roaming between 2G and 3G 
networks is already mandatory in several member states. An extension of these requirements 
would help MVNOs who need access to the radio elements of a MNO to offer services to 
subscribers. The new regime, by bringing roaming explicitly within the scope of ex ante 
regulation, seems to be a clear departure from the ambiguity of the old framework in this 
regard. No wonder that the qualified nature of access under the NRF reflects concerns about 
its impact on competition and investment. Whilst moving towards less regulation, the scope of 
                                                 
116 ComReg’s market analysis, pp. 11. and NPT’s market analysis, pp. 14.  
117  See Directive 97/33, Art. 2(1)(a) as well as Directive 90/388, Art. 1(1), as added by Directive 96/19. 
118 Article 2(a) of the Access Directive defines access as “… the making available of facilities and/or services to 
another undertaking, under defined conditions, on either an exclusive or non-exclusive basis for the purpose of 
providing electronic communications services.” 
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intervention broadened out which seems to be inherently paradoxical. However, based on the 
very first market analyses carried out under the auspices of the NRF, the question of 
“regulate-or-not-to-regulate” is undoubtedly linked to the need (or absence of the need) of 
imposing access obligations in order to optimise the retail market outcome. If NRAs 
concluded that the market is effectively competitive, they did so, because of not being 
enthusiastic to mandate any particular access. Thereby, ‘what access is required to optimise 
market outcome’119 seem to be the issue to be dealt with by NRAs, for example, by ComReg 
when concluding that the relevant access and call origination market is not effectively 
competitive, thus considering imposing national roaming obligations or mandating access for 
service providers and/or MVNOs. At the opposite end of the scale a less interventionist 
approach was taken by Oftel/Ofcom when deciding not to mandate MVNO access in light of 
increasing competition in the mobile market (no supplier has SMP, either individually or 
jointly). All in all, NRAs seem to have a tendency to equate the number of players with the 
level of competition and propose access obligations to bring the relevant market to an 
effectively competitive level.120
 
5.5 Perspectives on MVNOs’ regulatory environment 
 
As it has been stated above the NRF may materially affect the nature of regulation to which 
MVNOs are subject. The Eight Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Package indicates that “one aspect of access to electronic 
communications networks that is not mandated by the 1997’s regulatory framework, but that 
may be by individual NRA’s under the new one, and which is likely to play a growing role in 
the future, is the provision of access MVNOs”.121 Whereas in the bulk number of member 
states the MVNO model remains subject to sole commercial negotiations, there are some 
member states which have incorporated provisions into their national electronic 
communications law to govern such access (for example, in Finland the statutory provisions 
of the new Communications Market Act includes a provision allowing for such access).  
 
Several reasons have been advanced for opening MNOs’ networks to MVNOs. The biggest 
argument is that it would open mobile markets to new entrants and thus foster competition 
                                                 
119 Quoted from Ms. Katinka Mahieu 
120 Quoted from Ms. Katinka Mahieu 
121 See pp. 24. 
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and benefit consumers. MNOs who have recently had to pay large sums to secure licences and 
face significant further expenditure to develop their 3G networks, are concerned that MVNOs 
will end up benefiting at their expense. This concern is reflected in Italy’s decision not to 
allow MVNOs access to 3G networks for at least 10 years to ensure that licence holders are 
able to recoup at least some of their licence and network investments. MVNO supporters 
counter that opening up markets to MVNOs benefits MNOs as it allows them to recoup 
network development costs and affords MNOs in one country the opportunity to expand their 
own geographic coverage to markets where they have not secured a licence. This enables 
radio frequencies to be more broadly shared. As shown by the MVNO arrangement of Tele2 
and Telenor, the mutual agreement gives both companies MVNO access to each other’s GSM 
and future UMTS networks in Norway and Sweden.122 It should be noted that this agreement 
has been concluded purely on a commercial basis. The approach taken by the Swedish and the 
Norwegian regulator towards MVNOs is quite different: mobile operators were not required 
to give access to MVNOs in Norway, but Sweden introduced legislation requiring GSM 
operators to lease excess capacity to MVNOs.  
 
Regarding the former regulatory environment, it was not entirely clear that the services 
offered by MVNOs were covered by the Interconnection Directive. However, the ONP 
Committee concluded that Community law does not mandate access for MVNOs, and 
therefore it is a matter for commercial agreement between the parties.123 The interface 
between the two access regimes is well illustrated in ART’s (Autorité de Régulation des 
Télécommunications) decision which ruled that new entrant, Tele2 France had no right to 
require existing mobile operator, Orange France, to enter into an MVNO agreement. 
According to ART, MVNO services are essentially roaming services and therefore do not fall 
under the interconnection regime (i.e. Article 2.1 of EC Directive 97/33). However, ART 
noted that MVNO services should fall within the definition of access in Article 2 of the 
Access Directive of the NRF. The Access Directive clearly contemplates the sort of access 
required by MVNOs. In the definition of access, the Directive specifically refers to access to 
                                                 
122  Telenor press release available at http://press.telenor.com/PR/200209/873685_5.html 
123 ONP Committee, ’Access to fixed and mobile network infrastructures owner by operators designated as 
having significant market power’, Brussels, June 20, 1999 
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virtual network services and in Article 4, 5 and 12, it sets out the obligations that may be 
imposed on operators to offer access to other undertakings.124  
 
However, the Access Directive does not create a blanket right of access. In framing an access 
regime, NRAs “need to balance the right of an infrastructure owner to exploit the 
infrastructure for its own benefit, and the rights of other service providers to access facilities 
that are essential for the provision of competing services.”125 Further, in imposing ex ante 
obligations, the NRAs shall take into account the investment made by the SMP operator, and 
economic viability of using or installing competing facilities.126
 
5.6 Terms and Conditions of Access 
 
If access is to be mandated on mobile networks, the basis on which access will be charged 
must be considered. The charging basis for access to networks is a key determinant in the 
level of tariffs which the service provider can offer and consequently for increased price 
competition in the mobile market. There are a number of options as to the basis on which such 
access may be charged. These options may depend on the nature of the access in question e.g. 
airtime resale, indirect access or MVNO. The options include: retail minus prices, cost plus 
return on capital (similar to interconnection pricing), or commercial negotiation.  
 
The advantages of using retail minus include speed of implementation as it does not rely on 
the detailed capturing and measurement of costing information. A retail-minus price is aimed 
at ensuring that there is just sufficient margin for service providers to operate and does not 
disrupt the existing structure of retail prices. Cost oriented prices focus on the wholesale costs 
and can set a wholesale price where the SMP MNO is allowed to make a normal profit in that 
market.  
Clearly, there are potential difficulties if, over any extended period, the return to network 
operators is insufficient to fund future investment. Investors in the mobile market, like 
investors everywhere, seek out opportunities providing the potential for the most rapid and 
largest returns. The effects of such strong investor interest is clear when we consider the very 
                                                 
124 Under the Access Directive (Article 12 (1)) NRAs may impose access obligations on a SMP operator where it 
considers “…that denial of access or unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the 
emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level, or would not be in the end-users’ interest.” 
125 Ibid. Recital 19 
126 Ibid. Article 12 (2) 
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rapid deployment of complex and expensive mobile networks throughout Europe. The 
introduction of any or all of the various forms of access with any of the various pricing 
options described above, will have an effect on investment in networks. As ComReg 
elaborates on the issue of retail minus vs. cost orientation in its market analysis, the threat of 
cost-oriented methodology for setting national roaming prices can result in not encouraging 
the non-SMP (access-seeker) operator to build out its network.127 This is precisely why the 
“ladder” theory of investment which the ERG Common Position relies on has been so widely 
criticised by the MNOs.128 It has been argued that unless wholesale prices are, or are phased 
over time to become, sufficiently high, an alternative operator will always choose cheap 
access rather than build infrastructure. Once access is granted, especially if access charges are 
inefficiently low, regulators may find it difficult to remove such concessions, owing to the 
adverse impact on entrants whose business cases may depend on inefficiently low access 
prices.  
 
5.7 Is access to mobile networks for MVNOs a monopolistic bottleneck? 
 
As it has been described the monopolistic bottleneck approach wishes to define today’s 
bottlenecks that require regulation. It suggest to limit regulation to situations where a natural 
monopoly setting coincides with irreversible costs for potential entrants. Mobile networks 
cannot be considered such bottlenecks due to the very fact that several mobile network 
operators owning the corresponding number of mobile networks compete on the market.129 
Recalling the competitive concerns of bottleneck cases (i.e. there is no second or third such 
facility to reach end-users, in other words no active substitute is available), this approach 
disregards the possible scenario that based on the anti-competitive behaviour of the dominant 
operator(s), market entry might still be extremly difficult for a newcomer requesting any type 
of access, provided that this entry has a potential welfare effect on the downstream market. 
Therefore, the flexibility of the NRF proves to be effective in reconciling the “what-to-
regulate-and-what-not approach” with the threshold of dominance and the requirement of 
proportionality in connection with imposing appropriate remedies. It is clearly not adequate to 
phase out regulation in mobile communications based on the monopolistic bottleneck 
                                                 
127 See ComReg market analysis, pp. 84 
128 ERG (2004); pp. 13 et seq. 
129 See Knieps (1999); pp. 9 
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approach, because accordingly regulation could not be justified where a market has sufficient 
competitive potential.  
 
However, its purely structural approach towards the localization of regulation could be used 
to capture the reality of the current market analyses: the notion of indispensability clearly 
ventures into the concept of dominance meaning that the facility itself makes the undertaking 
dominant. To flesh out this finding, the market analysis carried out by Post- og Teletilsynet 
(Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority) should be summarized here.  
 
6 A brief sketch from a comparative perspective 
 
6.1 Norwegian mobile market: structural barriers to entry 
 
It is not the aim of this paper to provide a comprehensive guidance on the relevant legal 
framework on national level, as the underlying regulatory regime finds its common roots in 
the secondary legislation of the European Union. However, regarding Norway it should be 
noted that although the EU directives and soft law instruments will not apply formally to 
Norway, NPT has chosen to proceed in acordance with these regulations in the work on 
market analysis since the EFTA’s corresponding regulation have not yet been promulgated at 
the time of conducting the analysis. 
 
Based on the number of criteria envisaged in the Commission Guidelines on market analysis 
and the assessment of significant market power, NPT has issued its methodology to define 
relevant markets and evaluate their competitive state. The analysis of the market for access 
and call origination has been carried out accordingly, roughly divided into three groups of 
criteria:1) market share, profitability and structural indicators, 2) entry barriers, 3) other 
criteria. All the criteria will not be discussed in detail here, I would rather focus on the actual 
outcome of the analysis and structural merits to support my argument.  
 
The relevant market on the supply-side is made up of the network operators Telenor Mobil 
and NetCom and on the demand side by service providers (such as Chess, You, Tele2 and 
others). The analyis does not make a clear difference between MVNOs and service providers, 
all are included into the category of third party operators. The demand side also contains other 
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network operators, such as Teletopia and Hi3G, respective owners of a DCS-1800 licence and 
a UMTS licence in Norway. Both supply-side operators in the relevant market are currently 
obliged to allow access to their GSM networks, due to this obligation a range of service 
providers established themselves in the market.130 Though the relevant market is the 
wholesale market, yet a relatively large section of the document is devoted to the situation in 
the end user market, since the latter reflects upstream competition to a significant degree.  
 
NPT is confined to the view that the control of infrastructure can be an indicator of market 
power for the established operators, and the need for such infrastructure can act as an entry 
barrier for potential newcomers. If an operator controls infrastructure that is difficult to 
duplicate, and this infrastructure represents an important input factor in the relevant market, 
this could represent a substantial entry barrier for potential competitors. As long as there are 
available frequencies for mobile communication, it is technically possible to duplicate the 
existing networks. The question is, however, whether it would be difficult to duplicate 
networks due to financial and market-related conditions.131  NPT is of the view that the 
topography of Norway makes an infrastructure roll-out a lot more expensive than in other 
countries. Thus it would be extremely expensive to duplicate Telenor Mobil’s or NetCom’s 
entire network, and achieve comparable coverage. A widely-spread and small population, 
resulting in a relatively small traffic base, can make the individual costs extremely high in the 
case of a network with near-nationwide coverage (especially difficult to exploit economies of 
scale with more nationwide mobile networks). Therefore, NPT concludes that yet access to 
the existing infrastructure, at least in a transitional period, could reduce the impact of this 
entry barrier.  
 
As it has been described Telenor’s strong position in the Norwegian market in terms of input 
factors and the corresponding absence of potential upstream competition seems to play a more 
decisive role than the finding of high level of price competition in the market (price reduction 
in the end user market). Since new operators are dependent on access to the existing mobile 
infrastructure, at least in a transition period, NPT anticipates that potential competition does 
not weaken the market power of the two existing mobile network operators in the relevant 
market to a significant degree. However, NetCom’s market share (30%) does not reach the 
treshold of dominance (as NPT considers holding in excess of a 50% market share is a 
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rebuttable presumption of single dominance132), but Telenor Mobil’s market share in the end 
user market is just under 60%, whilst its market share as a network provider is around 70%, 
depending on the method of calculation which makes Telenor Mobil to become the SMP 
operator in the market for access and call origination. In any finding of single dominance, it is 
true that the larger the market share enjoyed by an individual undertaking, the greater the 
likelihood of a finding of SMP.  
 
Despite its relative importance, market share cannot be relied upon, to the exclusion of other 
factors, as being indicative of dominance. All in all, NPT’s conclusion is rather focused on 
structural characteristics of the Norwegian market derived from the difficulty to duplicate a 
mobile network with such coverage. As point 308 clearly states “the fact that Telenor Mobil 
has a mobile network with such coverage indicates that Telenor Mobil has significant market 
power.” No other market analysis has discussed the notion of entry barriers and high sunk 
costs that extensively due to which competition is limited. Having considered the significance 
of high barriers to entry, the potential for vastly reducing this barrier by the fact that barriers 
to expansion might appear to be low, has not been discussed. Despite the fact that Telenor 
Mobil has experienced a relatively significant decline in market share in the end user market 
in the period from 2000 to the second quarter of 2003, NPT found that the structural aspects 
of the market resulted in Telenor being a single dominan position. The document clearly calls 
for access regulation in order to weaken the market power of the SMP operator.   
 
6.2 Ireland: behavioural evidence  
 
Ireland’s Commission for Communications Regulation (ComReg) has published the findings 
of its review of the mobile market. In the course of its review, ComReg found that the access 
and call origination market has one of the highest concentrations in the EU, with the two 
leading operators (Vodafone and O2) having 95% of customers between them, with Meteor a 
distant third. 
 
ComReg is now proposing that both Vodafone and O2 will be designated as having SMP 
(joint or collective dominance) and will be obliged to allow other operators access to their 
networks. ComReg’s consultation finds that the prices of the two main operators have not 
                                                 
132 See AKZO v. Commission, Case C-62/86, [1991] ECRI-3359 
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changed significantly following the arrival of Meteor, with the two main operators having 
significantly higher ARPUs. These provide a strong indications of a lack of effective 
competition at the retail level. ComReg believes that the best way to ensure that customers 
can get greater choice and value for money is through enhanced competition and ComReg 
therefore proposes to introduce national roaming in order to strengthen the competitive 
offering of the other mobile network operators, by enabling them to give greater phone 
coverage to their customers throughout the country. ComReg is also consulting on whether 
Vodafone and O2 should also be obliged to provide access to service providers and MVNOs. 
This could allow service based telecoms companies to compete in the mobile market without 
having to build a full mobile network. 
 
However, the approach seem to differ from NPT’s devotion to structural barriers. ComReg is 
rather focussed on indicators suggesting that both Vodafone and O2 are able to insulate 
themselves from effective competitive pressure at the retail level. This ability is reinforced by 
the fact that both undertakings display a whole range of symmetrical characteristics that are 
conducive to the adoption of parallel behaviour.  
 
6.2.1 Competition concern: wholesale market behaviour 
 
At the wholesale level, there currently is a lack of access and call origination products in the 
market. ComReg is of the preliminary view that the absence of transactions at the wholesale 
level, is arguably itself a legitimate cause for concern as regards collective dominance. The 
failure of the MNOs to conclude access agreement is highly relevant in terms of its impact of 
on ComReg’s analysis of whether any of the MNOs are collectively dominant in the national 
wholesale market for access and call origination. Evidence over the last few years has shown 
that there is demand for wholesale access to mobile services, ranging from airtime resale, to 
MVNO access, to national roaming agreements, and that this demand has not been met.  
 
Currently, both ’3’ and Meteor are seeking to enter into national roaming agreements for 2G 
services with Vodafone and O2. Vodafone and O2 have an obligation to negotiate a national 
roaming agreement with ’3’ under the terms of their respective 3G licences, but it does not 
appear to ComReg that Meteor’s bargaining power vis a vis Vodafone and O2 is sufficient for 
it to obtain a commercially negotiated national roaming agreement with either MNO. 
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ComReg has reached the preliminary conclusion that Meteor does not constitute a significant 
competitive threat to the market position of O2 and Vodafone due to the lack of full 
geographic coverage and the absence of a national roaming agreement.  
 
 ComReg concluded that neither the wholesale level, nor the retail market is effectively 
competitive. It should be noted that competitive concerns arose primarly from the behaviour 
of the market players on both market segments (behavioural nature of competition problems). 
Aligned or consciously parallel behaviour hinders competition on the retail level and the lack 
of wholesale transactions despite pent-up demand for upstream services limits competition at 
both the wholesale and retail level. Following the approach of the ERG Common Position 
according to which when imposing ex ante remedies NRAs cannot actually observe a certain 
type of anti-competitive behaviour but will have to anticipate the appearance of a particular 
competition problem based on the incentives of an SMP operator to engage in such a 
behaviour, ComReg further elaborates on pricing and non-price issues as further possible 
sources of competition concerns.  
 
Therefore, the regulator believes that intervention through the imposition of appropriate 
remedies may be required at this time in order to restore proper incentives for MNOs to 
compete against each other.  
 
6.3 The United Kingdom: withdrawal of regulation 
 
According to David Edmonds, the former Director General of Telecommunications “It is a 
major landmark that sectoral regulation is no longer needed in this market to support 
competition. Oftel will now use general competition law powers to tackle any anti-
competitive behaviour.”   
 
This particular market analysis was the first of Oftel’s market reviews to finish, and represents 
a milestone by being the first one to be concluded by any EU telecoms regulator under the 
new EU legislation. Though the document itself does not address the issue of regulatory 
forbearance, clearly it was the last step in the withdrawal of regulation by Oftel over recent 
years, as competition has increased.  
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The conclusion notified by Oftel to the Commission was that competition on the market was 
effective and that no network operator had individual or joint SMP. This means that no one 
supplier has a significant market share over its competitors, or any significant cost, 
technological or other competitive advantage, and that there is no collective dominance. The 
latter was assessed on the basis of significant historical fluctuations in relative market shares, 
significant asymmetries of the relative profitability, continuing entry onto the retail market by 
service providers, fluctuating relative prices and retailers’ countervailing buyer power. It 
should be noted that the Commission was happy with Oftel’s market share analysis which was 
based on the state of the retail market, since the structure of supply at the wholesale level is 
derived from supply at the retail level. 
 
Historically, the UK mobile communications market was in favour of service provision. 
Between 1985 and 1993, there were only two operators, Cellnet and Vodafone. In attempt to 
stimulate competition, Cellnet and Vodafone were initially required to market their services 
only through independent service providers, rather than dealing directly with subscribers.133 
Since April 2002 there have been no regulatory obligations supporting the entry of service 
providers, but Vodafone and O2 had been obliged to provide indirect access on retail-minus 
basis. Before that, however, since 1998 there were obligations on Vodafone and BT Cellnet 
(later O2) of non-discrimination and the resale of wholesale airtime, which supported the 
entry of a large number of companies. The overall number of ISPs in the market has remained 
fairly constant since April 2002, at around 50 service providers. The service providers’ share 
of the market has continued to grow since the removal of the regulatory obligation to supply 
and this evidence suggests that regulatory withdrawal has had no negative impact on the 
ability of service providers to deliver services. This clearly shows that there is space for new 
providers and new products within the market. Those service providers that can deliver added 
value for consumers are more likely to do a good deal with a mobile operator for supply of 
wholesale services.134  
 
However, there have also been a number of entrants into the market who have not based their 
entry on regulatory support at all. Virgin Mobile is the most prominent example, but all the 
other major brands that have entered have done so bases only on commercial negotiation with 
networks. Based on this approach, Oftel concluded that whilst barriers to entry are a key part 
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of the competitive context, many other factors can determine the overall state of competition 
in the market. In fact, the overall level of competition is what really mattered, when deciding 
that no mobile network operator was dominant in the relevant market.  
 
Even the most profitable network operator’s market share does not reach the 40 per cent 
threshold normally considered to give rise to dominance concerns; the existence of collective 
dominance seemed the only potential way to trigger sector-specific regulation. Though a 
number of features of this market could be pointed to as evidence for the existence of 
collective dominance, a number of other factors do not support such a finding. One striking 
feature is the growth of strong retail competitors with negotiating power which seem to 
promote further network competition. As it has been discussed earlier, mobile network 
operators have different strategies toward service providers. T-Mobile has formed agreements 
despite not having any regulatory obligations to do so. Since their regulatory obligations 
ended, Vodafone and O2 have both made agreements with other providers, serving varying 
market segments, but Orange’s strategy has not involved service providers in this way. Such 
variations between mobile network operators do not indicate the existence of a co-ordinated 
approach in this market.  
 
Clearly, this market analysis provides the industry with the first real glimpse of “light touch” 
approach. As Nic Green from Oftel explained it to me in our e-mail correspondence: “[t]he 
view of removing regulation and not promoting MVNO access was based on our judgement 
of the level competition. That is often a difficult judgement but does need to be clearly 
justified in legal terms. We did not specifically consider exercising regulatory forbearance in 
this market, what we did simply followed at each stage what we thought we needed to do to 
ensure competition.” 
 
Whilst some EU countries have taken specific steps to encourage the development of MVNOs 
and the more enhanced SPs, in the UK Oftel has not differentiated within the independent SP 
sector and currently relies on the development of different ISP models through commercial 
negotiations with the MNOs. According to BT’s response to Oftel’ consultation document, 
Oftel (OFCOM) does need to monitor in the future the extent to which the more ‘value-added’ 
end of the independent service provider spectrum is being allowed to develop where SPs or 
 51
MVNOs are most likely to be able to increase consumer choice in terms of price and service 
packages.135   
 
6.4 Hungarian mobile market: absence of wholesale transactions  
 
Market number 15 has been defined as a relevant market according to the Recommendation. 
NHH (National Communications Authority) is of the preliminary view that it includes 
wholesale access and call origination services for MVNOs, for indirect access and access for 
value-added service providers. Interestingly enough, the list of upstream services does not 
include service providers as such.   
 
But the novelty of NHH’s approach certainly lies in the conclusion regarding the designation 
of SMP undertakings on the relevant market. NHH stated that the above-mentioned wholesale 
services have not been provided on the territory of Hungary (lack of transactions), but the 
corresponding retail market is effectively competitive. According to NHH, the total absence 
of wholesale transactions does not allow market analysis to be carried out regarding the 
wholesale segment of the market. The competitive retail market as such gave enough 
indications for NHH to conclude that the wholesale market is effectively competitive and no 
SMP operators should be designated. Though Article 12 of the Access Directive explicitly 
mentions the competitive development of the retail market as justification to impose (or not to 
impose) obligations on MNOs with SMP, the crucial issue at hand is more the alleged 
impossibility of economic analysis regarding the wholesale segment. 
 
Bronner and IMS should be remembered here, discussion of which has shown that the fact 
that no transactions are taking place does not prevent a competitive analysis. The notion of 
hypothetical market (access to the infrastructure constitutes a market in itself regardless of the 
fact that upstream services have not been marketed) has been addressed not just by the case-
law of the above chapter, but also by ComReg in its market analysis.136 It is rather 
controversial that despite the existing competition case-law NHH concluded that the lack of 
transactions prevent market analysis to be carried out. Recalling the similarities of the Irish 
and Hungarian market, in both countries no MNOs offer wholesale access and call origination 
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services to other service providers, though in Ireland this is so despite of the existing pent-up 
demand. However, the Irish regulator came to a different conclusion according to which the 
absence of transactions at the wholesale level is arguably itself a legitimate cause for concern 
as regards collective dominance. 
 
Logically, if no SMP operators are designated, just because a wholesale market, in which no 
transactions take place, allegedly cannot be analysed based on objective criteria, the contrary 
could also be concluded based on the very same logic; it cannot be unambigously stated that 
individually or jointly dominant operators do not exist in the market. NHH concluded that 
there has be price reduction in the end user market which together with volatility in market 
shares indicates that MNOs are competing vigorously. However, retail price level based on an 
international price comparison still indicates that an average Hungarian end-user with medium 
usage still pays more than an Irish, Norwegian or English customer.137  
 
NRAs are specifically obliged to investigate whether single or joint dominance exists in the 
wholesale market. In order to undertake this analysis, it is necessary to examine certain 
criteria that relate to the retail level. This is because competitive conditions at the retail level 
are relevant to the existence of market power at the wholesale level. For example, it does not 
follow from the fact that operators are vertically integrated and may not supply wholesale 
services to third parties that they have market power at the wholesale level. Any such power 
could be constrained by competition between vertically integrated operators at the retail level. 
Moreover, if vertical integration is efficient, the adoption by a number of firms of a vertically 
integrated structure could not then be construed as evidence of co-ordinated conduct. The 
question seems to be whether the effectiveness of the wholesale market could be a regulatory 
goal as such, or it should only be considered as a regulatory tool to contribute to the 
competitive outcome of the retail market?   
 
The answer seems to touch on value judgement of NRAs. As it has been mentioned in chapter 
2.2, the NRF aims to identify and create values which value creation introduces constraints on 
the type of actions that NRAs may undertake. Decision making often involves careful 
consideration of contradictory objectives, thereby NRAs will have to pick and choose among 
them in order to achieve a priority goal, let it be infrastructure roll-out or service-based 
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competition. Taking into account the fact that MNOs have just been invited by NHH to tender 
for UMTS licences and NHH’s goal seem to be to induce one more network operator to enter 
the market as the fourth network operator, this value judgement obviously calls for the kind of 
consumer welfare standard to be applied in the pending market analysis which will not 
threaten investors with potential intervention. 
 
6 Conclusions – a role for regulation? 
 
In summary, unlike fixed telephony, mobile markets have been characterised by intense and 
increasing competition. This is evidenced by, amongst other things, high penetration level, 
falling prices, the availability of wide ranges of tariffs and packages, high levels of switching 
and rapid innovation. Accordingly, MNOs are of the view that mobile operators should be 
treated just as any other undertakings of unregulated markets where, if market failures occur, 
they are addressed using ordinary competition law mechanisms.  
 
There is considerable scope for argument, as to what extent wholesale mobile access and call 
origination market should be regulated, due to expectations of the impact of NRF and its 
mixture of concepts borrowed from competition law, which is meant to reduce the gap 
between a system of regulation and a deregulated environment. In particular, the effects of the 
new test are hard to predict in markets where there are a limited number of players and 
significant barriers to entry. The uncertainties as to the test for joint dominance give rise to 
doubts as to whether, in some apparently oligopolistic situations (such as the one at stake), 
regulation of all players, or none of the players will be the outcome of market analysis. Very 
often the marketplace itself demands that MNOs compete rigorously for the retail market, 
even as it demands that they collaborate to reap the benefits of shared costs and expertise. As 
all the capital-intensive industries are, by definition, resource hungry, so is mobile telephony, 
but that investment is made with the expectation that it will sustain the industry over the long 
term. Whether regulation imposes needless burdens and consequently regulatory forbearance 
should be exercised, or on the contrary, intervention contributes to competitive outcome, it 
has been evaluated by European regulators. They all are given the very same regulatory tools 
to tackle the issue, but their value judgements might considerably differ.  
 
 54
It was the aim of this paper to discuss whether access to the radio network provision level is 
considered as a bottleneck element and it has been argued that where second or third facility 
exists to reach end-users, it is very doubtful that the facility would qualify for an essential 
facility and thus call for mandatory access. But based on the dominance test the threshold for 
single of joint dominance triggers ex-ante intervention and paves the way for a potential 
access regime. As it has been described the assessment of SMP could be approached from a 
rather structural perspective (like Norway) or from a behaviour-focussed angle (like Ireland). 
In these jurisdictions, the question is not whether there is more or less regulation, but what 
type of regulation is needed, more precisely what sort of access might be necessary to 
optimise market outcome.   
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